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The Quiet Rise of the Far-Left
Austin J. Hudgens
University of Washington, Seattle
Abstract
 Throughout the past year, the political commentary has focused on the rise of 
right-wing populism and the success of conservative and alt-right parties. In their fascination 
with the Right, many in Europe have dismissed the Left as a dying breed, a social movement 
that once held sway, but has failed to offer an alternative to unfettered capitalism. This paper 
will examine the electoral successes of Die Linke in Germany, SYRIZA in Greece, and 
Unidos Podemos in Spain, to push back against this narrative. I will contrast these successes 
with the poor performances of traditional center left parties, such as the Social Democrats in 
Germany and the Spanish Socialist Workers Party. Lastly, I will compare certain strategies 
that have worked well for SYRIZA, Die Linke, and Unidos Podemos and compare these 
to the reactions of center left parties such as the SPD and the UK Labour Party.
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Introduction
 Throughout the past several years, the political commentary has focused on the 
rise of right-wing populism and the success of conservative and alt-right parties. In their 
fascination with the Right, many in Europe have dismissed the Left as a dying breed, a social 
movement that once held sway, but has failed to offer an alternative to unregulated capital-
ism and globalization. This view is incorrect. The decline of traditional Social Democrats 
in many of the core states of the EU is undeniable. However, far-left parties, within many 
of these countries, have continued to hold sway. This paper will examine the electoral suc-
cesses of Die Linke in Germany, SYRIZA in Greece, and Unidos Podemos in Spain, to 
push back against the narrative of a declining Left. I will contrast these successes with the 
poor performances of traditional center-left parties, such as the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) in Germany and the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE). Next, I will compare 
certain strategies that have worked well for SYRIZA, Die Linke, and Unidos Podemos, 
and use these to analyse how two centrist parties, the UK Labor Party and the SPD, have 
adapted to a more powerful far-left. I will conclude this paper by making the case that the 
European Left is still strong and viable, but must be weary of the trap of centrist politics.
The	Rise	of	Social	Democracy	and	the	Left
 Social democracy grounded its roots towards the turn of the century in the late 
1800s. At first, the Left emerged with a program of social welfare and greater rights for the 
working class. During this period, the Left was made up of both socialists and communists 
with both pushing for greater rights for labour, and at points advocating for overthrowing 
the capitalist system. In tandem with the workers movements, social democracy advocated 
for an expansion of citizens rights, including in the 1891 German Social Democratic plat-
form, “universal adult suffrage, the right of referendum, the election of judges, the separa-
tion of church and state…” (Sassoon, 2015, p. 20), and other liberal ideals. This advocacy 
for greater rights associated with the working class and for national parliaments put social 
democracy clearly on the path to becoming the center-left alternative to conservative gov-
ernments.
 The birth of social democracy traces back to Northern Europe where the first So-
cial Democratic parties took power. The distinction, of social democracy, came into being 
with the break between those who advocated achieving socialist goals through revolution, 
and those who advocated for working within democracy in order to achieve socialist goals. 
Social Democrats, those who argued for a peaceful process of implementing socialist goals, 
came to the conclusion that so long as capitalism’s negative crises could be averted and full 
unemployment could be achieved, then capitalism could remain. Their continued support 
of workers’ unions lead to the first electoral success of Social Democrats, particularly in 
Northern Europe in the interwar period. However, this electoral success did not always 
equate to governing. Many Social Democratic parties, especially the SPD in Germany, were 
tainted by World War I (WWI) and parties on the left (such as Communists and Indepen-
dent Social Democrats) refused to support an SPD government. 
 The post World War II (WWII) years saw the increased governing and electoral 
viability of Social Democratic parties across Europe. In Nordic countries such as Sweden 
and Norway, Social Democratic parties, “hegemonized the left and largely dominated the 
political spectrum as a whole” (McCrone & Keating, 2015, p. 36). The electoral success of 
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these parties created the “Middle Way” or “Nordic Model” which was embraced by most 
Social Democratic parties across Europe. These models comprised free market capitalism, 
collective bargaining, and state involvement with welfare provisions. These policies proved 
effective and ushered in prosperity for Europe post WWII. However, the Arab Oil Embar-
go of the 70s brought to an end the dominance of social democracy in Europe, and ushered 
in an era of uncertainty for the European center-left.
The	Decline	of	the	Core	Social	Democratic	Parties
 Through the late 2000s into the 2010s, center-left Social Democrats have fared 
poorly in much of Europe, with the exception of Scandinavia. The SPD in Germany and 
the PSOE in Spain have both seen their share of the vote decline sharply. The SPD has been 
kept out of power since 2007 while the PSOE, having been in power from 2004-2011, has 
seen its support evaporate since then.
 Since the restoration of democracy in Spain, the PSOE and the Popular Party (PP) 
have enjoyed the status of being the two largest parties in Spain. The PSOE has lead the 
government on many occasions including most recently from 2008 to 2011. However, due 
to the onset of the 2008 Great Recession and the PSOE’s poor handling of the government, 
the PSOE has been on a downward electoral spiral. Following a historic high in 2008 of 
43.9% of the vote and 169 seats in Parliament, the PSOE had its worst showing in 2011. 
The PSOE won only 29% of the vote, and only 110 seats in parliament (Kennedy, 2014, p. 
176-177). This result was the outcome of a severe austerity package endorsed by the PSOE 
in order to cope with the economic catastrophe of the Great Recession, which resulted in 
a, “5 percent reduction in civil servants’ salaries, the slashing of public sector investment, the 
freezing of pensions, and the extension of the retirement age from 65 to 67 (Kennedy, 2014, 
p. 177). The decline in support for the PSOE and its centrist rival the PP has only increased 
since the 2011 elections. In the 2015 and 2016 elections the PP and PSOE captured only 
55.7% of the vote, down from 83.8% in 2008 (Payne, Gregory, Casero-Ripollés, Andreu, 
Sintes-Olivella, Marçal, French, 2017, p. 989). Following these elections, the PSOE once 
again has found itself in the midst of succession crisis after leader Pedro Sanchez was forced 
out due to his opposition to a coalition with the PP, something that was heavily favored by 
PSOE political heavyweights (Lancaster, 2017, p. 934). 
 My other example of a center-left party in decline is the SPD in Germany. As an 
offshoot of one of the first Social Democratic parties in Europe, the SPD has played a large 
role in Germany’s labor movement, and the implementation of the welfare state post WWII 
in Germany. The SPD has traditionally been one of the two major parties in German poli-
tics; the other being the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Since the founding of the 
Federal Republic, however,  the SPD has lead a government only six out of the nineteen 
elections. In recent years, the SPD’s vote share sharply declined due in large part to the 
neoliberal Hartz IV reforms, implemented by SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in 2003 
(Dostal, 2017). In addition to these reforms, from 2005-2009 and from 2013-2017, the SPD 
governed as the junior partner in a grand coalition with the CDU. The most recent elec-
tions, in September 2017, saw the worst showing yet for the SPD. The SPD won 20.5% of 
the vote, only 8% higher than the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which gained 
seats in parliament for the first time. Following these elections, and the failure of the Jamaica 
Coalition, a proposed coalition between the CDU/CSU, FDP, and Greens, the SPD agreed 
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to join another grand coalition lead by the CDU. The decline in vote share for the SPD is 
remarkable when comparing the SPD’s electoral percentage from the 2002 elections to their 
electoral percentage in the 2017 elections. In 2002 the SPD won 38.5% of the vote, while 
in 2017 it won only 20.5%; a striking decline for one of Europe’s standard bearers for social 
democracy.
What	is	the	Far-Left
 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, leftist parties across Europe and the 
world underwent an identity crisis. Communists and leftists redefined what they stood for 
and the means upon which they wished to achieve these goals. From this reinvention, the 
far-left became defined as those to the left of social democracy, which they see as insuf-
ficiency left-wing (March, 2009). These parties can be in the form of communists, trade-
unionists, leftists, anti-capitalists, and more. Within Europe, the popularity of these parties 
has returned, due in part to disenchantment with traditional social democracy.
Electoral	success	and	the	Far-Left
 Despite the tumultuous trajectory of center-left parties in the post 2008 financial 
collapse, leftist parties have grown in several key countries. This is true in particular in 
Greece, Germany, and Spain. All three of these countries has seen the rise of far-left parties 
in post 2008 elections. These electoral upticks are in contrast to the prevailing theory that 
the Left is in retreat across Europe.
 The first such case is that of Greece. Greece was hit hardest by the Eurozone crisis 
which sent their party system into chaos. The Greek party system, since the restoration of 
democracy in 1974, has been characterized by the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PA-
SOK) on the center-left, and New Democracy (ND) on the center-right. These two parties 
have suffered greatly at the hands of SYRIZA, a far-left anti-austerity party. SYRIZA came 
to prominence after the first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2010 between 
Greece and its creditors which led to virulent opposition among Greek voters. The result 
of this first MoU, “would be the complete reshaping of the party system between 2010 and 
2015” (Tsakatika, 2016, p. 4). The MoU imposed harsh austerity measures in Greece that 
lead to protests and strikes across the country (Wearden, 2010). This MoU was agreed to by 
PASOK, which following the agreement has borne the brunt of the electoral consequences. 
During the lead up to the MoU, SYRIZA campaigned heavily against the agreement and 
expanded their electoral message to encompass not only their leftist economic policies but 
also to harness the protest vote. This lead to large electoral gains in the ensuing elections. By 
2012, SYRIZA gained 16.8% of the vote, a near four fold increase from its 4.6% of the vote 
in 2009. Elections were held again in June of 2012 after SYRIZA, now the second largest 
party, refused to form a coalition government with the ND. In the June election, SYRIZA 
again increased its proportion to, “26.6 percent, assuming the role of official opposition to 
the new coalition government of PASOK, ND and DIMAR that resulted from the elec-
tion” (Tsakatika, 2016, p. 6). In the following 2015 elections, SYRIZA saw its’ vote share 
jump to its highest level, 36.3%, which brought SYRIZA into government. SYRIZA’s 
election coincided with the discussion of a third MoU and SYRIZA’s fierce opposition to 
such a move. Though the party fiercely opposed the MoU, after several months of nego-
tiations, Greece’s creditors suspended payments and Greece neared financial collapse. This 
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lead to the signing of the MoU in late 2015 and another election. SYRIZA still carried the 
election, with 35.5% of the vote, which continued the Tsipras government and SYRIZA’s 
electoral good fortune. 
 Another leftist party that has seen its vote share increase steadily is Die Linke in 
Germany. Die Linke is the successor party of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in the former 
East Germany. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, it rebranded itself as the Party of Democratic 
Socialism (PDS) in order to compete in elections. After a decade competing as the PDS, 
the party merged with the The Electoral Alternative for Labor and Social Justice (WASG), 
and finally became Die Linke. The WASG was a breakaway party of the SPD that came 
into being because it, “opposed Schröder’s economic and labour market reforms [and was 
comprised of]...unionists, disaffected SPD members as well as tiny communist groups and 
radical green leftists with a weak common ideology” (Coffe´/Plassa, 2010, p. 144). Die 
Linke situated itself as the alternative left wing party to the Schröder lead SPD-Green gov-
ernment in the 2005 elections. The party called for a minimum wage, a shorter work week, 
an expanded public works sector, a minimum pension of 800 euros a month, free daycare, 
and more financial support to families with children. Die Linke also opposed university 
tuition, privatization of public assets, and services and liberalization of markets. It was with 
these policies that the party was able to distinguish itself as a more left wing alternative to the 
governing center-left coalition that had been attacking some of these leftist principles. Die 
Linke’s campaign strategy worked well, with the party winning 8.7% of the vote nation-
ally in 2005 and earning 54 seats in parliament, surpassing the best that either the PDS or 
WASG had ever done. Since then, Die Linke has secured more parliamentary seats in every 
election, except the 2013 election where it secured 8.2% of the vote, but 64 seats. Though 
Die Linke owes some of its success to its reputation as an East German protest party, due to 
its history, its appeal as an alternative to centrist politics can not be ignored. In these most 
recent elections, though it lost ground to the AfD in eastern German Länder, it was able to 
maintain and/or grow its voter base in many western Länder (Burn-Murdoch, Ehrenberg-
Shannon, Bernard, Maier-Borst, Stabe, 2017). 
 Lastly, the leftist party Unidos Podemos has challenged the two party system that 
has long dominated Spain. Unidos Podemos was formed in 2014 as an electoral alliance be-
tween Podemos, United Left, Equo, and several other smaller leftist parties. The party also 
has its roots in the social movement 15-M, which advocated against the austerity measures 
and economic crisis that struck Spain and many other EU countries (Payne, Gregory, Ca-
sero-Ripollés, Andreu, Sintes-Olivella, Marçal, French, 2017, p. 988). From its inception, 
Unidos Podemos emerged as a protest party on two fronts. Firstly, Unidos Podemos op-
posed how democracy was working in Spain and the privilege and corruption of traditional 
political actors within the system (Payne, Gregory, Casero-Ripollés, Andreu, Sintes-Oliv-
ella, Marçal, French, 2017, p. 988). The other tennant that Unidos Podemos was founded 
on was opposition to the, “effects of the international economic crisis on the lives of the 
majority of Spanish citizens” (Payne, Gregory, Casero-Ripollés, Andreu, Sintes-Olivella, 
Marçal, French, 2017, p. 988). Unidos Podemos has seen its success explode since its incep-
tion in 2014. In the 2014 European elections, Unidos Podemos won 5 seats in the European 
Parliament, with 1.2 million votes. In the 2015 and 2016 Spanish general elections, Unidos 
Podemos won over 5 million votes, claiming 21.1% of the total vote (Payne, Gregory, 
Casero-Ripollés, Andreu, Sintes-Olivella, Marçal, French, 2017, p. 989). This meant that 
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Unidos Podemos entered the Spanish Parliament as the third largest party. Though Pablo 
Iglesias, the leader of Unidos Podemos, was disappointed by the 2016 elections showing, 
Unidos Podemos still managed to maintain its share of the votes and avoided a violent intra-
party split like the PSOE. 
Reactions	of	the	Center-Left 
 Reactions to the decline of support of center-left parties, and the emergence of 
leftists challengers, have varied across Europe. Two notable differences are between the SPD 
and the Labour Party in the UK. Following poor showing for both parties, the two pursued 
differing strategies in order to win back voters. 
 The SPD, half-heartedly attempted to move more towards the left in the lead up 
to the 2017 German elections. Under Martin Shultz, the SPD called for a “correction” to 
the Hartz IV and Agenda 2010, as well as emphasizing solidarity and a greater focus on 
“social justice” (Knight, 2017). However, these feints toward the left have not won back 
many voters to the SPD. The SPD’s pivot left was done in an attempt to rebrand the SPD 
after many years as the junior partner in the Grand Coalition. Following the SPD’s worst 
ever showing in an election, Martin Schultz announced that the party would not go back 
into coalition with the CDU. However, after the collapse of coalition talks between the 
prospective Jamaica coalition (CDU/CSU, Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the Greens), 
the SPD returned to the bargaining table and agreed to join another Grand Coalition. This 
was met with exasperation from the youth wing of the SPD, which actively campaigned 
against another grand coalition. This latest Grand Coalition has also not been met with en-
thusiasm from either side of the political aisle, and risks further tarnishing the SPD’s already 
poor reputation among voters on the left.
 To contrast the SPD’s reaction, one must look no further than the Labour party in 
the UK. Although coalition governments are less relevant in the UK due to their First Past 
the Post system, which tends to favor the two largest parties, Labour has seen its popularity 
dramatically rise due to doubling down on soft-Brexit and pro-leftists policies. Following 
the Tony Blair administration, Labour had not fared well in elections. By 2010 the party, 
“was down to just 29% of the vote” (McCrone & Keating, 37), from a high of 40.7% in 
2001. Since 2015, Labour has positioned itself as the soft-Brexit and pro-leftist party, similar 
to SYRIZA’s anti-austerity politics following the first MoU. Jeremy Corbyn, the leader 
of Labour, has continuously attacked Prime Minister Theresa May over her flirting with a 
“hard Brexit”, and has used this as a means to attract those worried about Britain’s future 
outside the EU. Corbin has been a vocal supporter of a “soft-Brexit” and has even gone so 
far as to suggest that parliament should have a final vote on if the UK really leaves (Barry, 
2018). On the economic front, Labour’s most recent party manifesto has reemphasized its 
socialist roots and supported leftist economic policies such as renationalizing water and en-
ergy companies, and the railways, as well as expanding funding to the NHS, and abolishing 
university tuition fees, to name a few  (BBC, 2017). These policies have paid off well for 
Labour. Following the snap elections called by Prime Minister May in 2017, the Tories lost 
their majority in Parliament and were forced to work with the Northern Irish Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP) in order to form a government. In contrast, Labor picked up 30 
seats, and ended with one of its best election results, acquiring 40% of the vote. However, 
this does not mean that Labour has no challenges whatsoever. An underlying uncertainty 
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in this strategy is Scotland. Scotland has traditionally been a Labour safe haven within the 
UK. However, over the past decade the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) has “undermined 
[Labour] in its heartlands in Scotland” (McCrone & Keating, 2015, p. 36). By taking a more 
pro-EU, soft-Brexit stance, Labour fared better in Scotland, while the SNP lost 21 seats in 
the election. By moving more to the left, Labour has been able to reinvigorate its traditional 
base, “which consists of industrial trade unions and the working class” (McCrone & Keat-
ing, 2015, p. 36), while also presenting itself as a protest party against a hard Brexit.
Strategies	of	the	Far-Left
 The electoral strategies of SYRIZA, Die Linke, and Unidos Podemos, show the 
effectiveness of embracing leftist ideology despite economic collapse and the need for aus-
terity. For SYRIZA the road to electoral success was expanding its appeal beyond the disaf-
fected leftists, to encompass a broader range of voters, in particular, those looking to cast a 
protest vote. By situating themselves as the alternative to austerity and the alternative to the 
“Brussels elite”, SYRIZA was able to exploit the shift of the center-left PASOK towards the 
political center. The other strategy SYRIZA embraced, was not being drawn into a govern-
ment coalition to soon. This conception came from the party’s founders, who were, “mind-
ful especially of the experience of the French Communist Party’s participation in both the 
Mitterrand (1981–84) and Jospin (1997–2002) centre-left coalition governments, which 
[were] assessed as having been instrumental in the PCF’s electoral decline” (Tsakatika, 2016, 
p. 8). By refusing to govern with parties that had agreed to the first MoU, SYRIZA set itself 
apart as a protest party to the deteriorating conditions many Greeks found themselves in. 
It also staved off early absorption into mainstream politics and thus, loosing seats by being 
bogged down in governing.
 Die Linke has fared increasing well since its unification with WASG in 2005. By 
occupying a position as a leftist and eastern protest party, Die Linke is able to capitalize on 
the, “losers of modernization” (Doerschler, 2015, p. 382). Die Linke’s platform today is still 
aligned with the socialist ideology of the PDS and, in parts, its predecessor the Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED). Die Linke espouses a myriad of left wing positions in-
cluding raising of the minimum wage to 12 Euro an hour, anti-fascism, anti-islamophobia, 
the end of “Minijobs” and Hartz IV, increasing state pensions to 53% of national income, 
a special tax on fortunes of over 1 million euros in order to fund infrastructure and schools, 
and health care egalitarianism (Knight, 2017). These positions reflect consistency with the 
platform of the PDS. These similarities center on an explicitly anti-fascist rhetoric, a con-
demnation of Neoliberal economics, the use of class struggles as rhetoric, a higher minimum 
wage, and a rebuke of extreme right parties. Studies of the party platforms of WASG and 
the PDS found that, “the programme of their successor, Die Linke, is clearly closer to the 
PDS than to the WASG” (Coffe´/Plassa, 2010, p. 731), emphasising Die Linke’s socialist 
bonafides. The leftists politics of Die Linke have proven fruitful among voters as well. This is 
evidenced by the SPD losing an, “estimated net 1,100,000 voters to the Left in 2009, more 
than to any other party” (Patton, 2011, p. 144). Additionally, the SPD’s refusal to work with 
Die Linke on a national level has seen that party grow as a challenger on the left in social as 
well as economic issues. The SPD’s refusal to work with Die Linke on a national level has 
also allowed for the party to maintain its ideological purity on the national level, disassociat-
ing it with any negative policies passed by ruling parties.
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 Similar to the strategy employed by Die Linke and Syriza, Unidos Podemos has 
capitalized on the PSOE’s centrist shift. Unidos Podemos challenged the PSOE by promot-
ing a, “strong anti-big-business orientation,..[and a] push for socio-economic justice with 
[an] emphasis on a new and fair model of society” (Lancaster, 2017, p. 921-922). Prior to 
the formation of Unidos Podemos, both Podemos and United left, the two largest parties 
that formed Unidos Podemos, capitalized on the decline of the centrists People's Party (PP) 
and PSOE. In the 2014 European parliament elections, the United Left and Podemos won 
10.0% and 7.2% respectively, at the cost of the PSOE and the center-left (Lancaster, 2017, 
p. 924). This decline in the centrist party support was mirrored in the 2015 and 2016 elec-
tions, where the PP and PSOE captured only 55.7% of the vote, down from 83.8% in 2008 
(Payne, Gregory, Casero-Ripollés, Andreu, Sintes-Olivella, Marçal, French, 2017, p. 989). 
Following the 2015 election, Podemos’ strategy of refusing to join a coalition government 
with PP furthered its credentials as an authentic leftists party, and secured its voter base 
going into the 2016 election, in which the PSOE continued its electoral decline. Follow-
ing the 2016 elections, the PSOE was fraught with infighting, and ousted its leader Pedro 
Sanchez. Its party then split on endorsing Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy of the PP, and 
thus allowed him to remain Prime Minister. Unidos Podemos, on the other hand, opposed 
Rajoy’s election due to his support of austerity and neoliberal politics. Though the outcome 
of these political decisions have not yet been fully felt, the fact that Unidos Podemos has 
maintained its unity, while the PSOE has descended into infighting, suggests the benefits of 
a more left of center position. 
Conclusion
 In closing, the Left has been deemed a dying breed. Far-right parties have risen 
across Europe, and the media frenzy surrounding them has drowned out most of the op-
position. This rise in the far-right has been coupled with the decline of center-left parties in 
the core of Europe. Parties such as the PSOE and the SPD have faced serious electoral crises 
and infighting that have left them structurally weak. However, this is not the full story of 
the European Left. SYRIZA, Die Linke, and Unidos Podemos are all examples of parties 
of the left pursuing leftist strategies in order to increase their electoral share. By position-
ing themselves as saviors of the European welfare state, and alternatives to the conservative 
forces sweeping through Europe, all three have enjoyed success. These successes, by and 
large, have come from winning voters over from the traditional center-left. While center-
left politics have increasingly coalleseed around the center, far-left parties have been able to 
win back those who feel left out by globalization, and the traditional working class base of 
the left. Their model for success is something that will become necessary for other parties 
on the Left across Europe to take note of. For in order to overcome the extreme right in 
Europe, the Left must articulate a coherent platform that does not betray its core socialist 
values in order to win over non existent voters in the political center. 
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